Trump Waives the Graham Act's Russia Tariffs and Specified Sanctions

Analysis

A tariff is a tax on imported goods, also called a duty. Here the intended pressure reaches beyond Russia: a country buying Russian oil could face a higher tax on its goods entering the United States. On October 16 , President Trump signed an order waiving the new duties and specified sanctions and restrictions in the Russia title of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. A waiver means setting aside their application, not repealing the law.

The one-minute reading

President Trump has switched off the Graham Act's new Russia duties and specified sanctions without repealing them. The October 16 order specifies a 500 percent increase on Russian goods and 100 percent increases for qualifying large buyers of Russian oil and gas and large facilitators of sanctions evasion, but makes each rate subject to waivers.

The mechanism is secondary pressure: a third country could face a higher tax on its goods entering the United States because of its Russian energy purchases or activity. While the waiver remains, even a qualifying purchase creates no duty under these provisions. The waivers have no stated expiry, but they can be revoked. Reapplying the penalties would still require country determinations, reports, rate-setting and exceptions under the law . The order therefore removes immediate Act-based tariff risk while preserving a possible future tool. It does not show that energy purchases, shipping or prices will change. Publication of the certification and report, congressional action and actual purchasing data would clarify how durable and consequential the waiver is.

The five-minute analysis

The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act created duties and restrictions intended to reach Russia and third countries dealing with it. A tariff is a tax on imports. Here, a secondary tariff could raise the tax on goods a third country sells into the United States if that country meets conditions involving Russian oil, natural gas or sanctions evasion. The intended pressure is a choice between some Russian business and access to the US market.

The authenticated Public Law 119-111 authorizes a duty increase of up to 500 percent on Russian goods. President Trump's October 16 implementation order specifies a 500 percent increase. It also specifies 100 percent increases for qualifying large importers knowingly making new purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas on or after October 18, and for qualifying large facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion. Each specified rate is subject to the order's waivers.

That last point controls the immediate effect. A purchase alone does not trigger the duty, and no Act-based secondary duty applies while the waiver remains in force. The order also waives specified sanctions and restrictions in sections 102(a), 102(d), 102(e), and 103 through 111, as well as duties under sections 112 and 113. It separately waives a termination and congressional-review procedure. Other provisions, including the Iran Sanctions Act extension, are not waived.

The law permits a waiver after the president sends Congress a certification that it serves the national interests of the United States and a report explaining why. The order says those documents were submitted. AA has not independently seen them or separate evidence of transmission, so the administration's reasoning is not available in the cited record. The report must be unclassified, though it may include a classified annex.

The waivers are open-ended but revocable. They continue until the president or secretary of state, after the specified consultation, decides further action is appropriate. No calendar expiration is stated. Revocation would not instantly make every Russian-energy buyer subject to one fixed tariff: the Act still requires qualifying top-five status, country determinations, a rate-setting method, reports to Congress and specified exceptions.

Congressional pressure continues. In an October 6 letter , Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Roger Wicker urged the administration to use European Union, United Kingdom and Group of Seven designations as a baseline, enforce restrictions on new US investment and Russian sovereign debt, and apply mandatory secondary sanctions against suppliers to Russia's military industry. Their statement that most provisions were due to take effect October 18 is their characterization.

The observed causal chain is limited: the president waived the listed duties and restrictions, so they are not presently applied. The conditional next step is that revocation and the required determinations could restore Act-based costs for qualifying countries. Removing immediate tariff risk could make purchases easier at the margin, but discounts, freight, insurance, politics and other sanctions still shape decisions. The order by itself establishes no change in oil or diesel prices, shipping, production or asset values.

The view would change with publication of the certification and report, a revocation or congressional response, named country determinations, or purchasing and shipping data that move after the order. Until then, the law remains available but its specified pressure is dormant. That distinction is more precise than treating either the enactment or the waiver as an automatic change in energy flows.

The scope is also narrower than “all Russia sanctions.” The order says it preserves specified harmful-foreign-activities measures as they stood on September 17, while waiving only listed parts of the new Act. Sections 102(b), 102(c), 114, 115 and 116 are not expressly waived, and the Iran title remains. That section-by-section structure matters to firms assessing legal exposure: removal of one new duty does not erase other sanctions, investment restrictions, shipping constraints or compliance costs. The immediate commercial question is not simply whether the Act exists, but which provisions apply to a particular country, purchase and transaction while the waiver is active.

How the pressure would work

Most sanctions, restrictions meant to punish a target, act directly on that target. A secondary tariff instead raises the cost of selling goods to the United States for another country that meets the law's conditions. The intended choice is between access to the U.S. market and purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas.

Analogy, with limits: Congress built the penalty circuit; the President holds the switch. The switch is off, but the wiring stays. Turning it back on is not frictionless: the Act requires qualifying top-five status, country determinations, a method for setting rates, advance reports to Congress and specified exceptions.

The authenticated text of Public Law 119-111 gives the full title above and its September 18 approval date. The Act sets maximum rates; the October 16 order specifies rates, each "subject to" the waivers:

Russian goods: the Act authorizes an increase to a rate of up to 500 percent ad valorem ; the order specifies a 500 percent increase . "Ad valorem" means charged as a percentage of the goods' value.

Large importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas: the order specifies a 100 percent increase for qualifying countries that knowingly make new purchases on or after October 18.

Large facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion: the order specifies a 100 percent increase for qualifying countries.

The October 18 threshold applies to new purchases on or after that date. A purchase alone does not trigger the duty. Even an otherwise qualifying purchase produces no Act-based secondary duty while the waiver remains in force.

What keeps the switch off

The law permits a waiver after the President sends Congress a certification, a written statement that the waiver meets the legal standard, and a report explaining why. The standard is the "national interests of the United States". The report must be unclassified but may have a classified annex. The order says both documents were submitted; AA has not independently seen either or separate evidence of transmission.

The waivers are open-ended and revocable . They last until the President or the Secretary of State, after the specified consultation, determines further action is appropriate. No calendar expiry is stated. That does not make them permanent.

The order also sets aside a separate termination and congressional-review procedure. It leaves the Act's extension of the Iran Sanctions Act unwaived. It says it preserves specified executive-order measures addressing harmful foreign activities of the Russian government as those measures stood on September 17 . That limited statement does not establish that every Russia-related sanctions program is otherwise unchanged.

The view from Congress

In an October 6 letter , Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Roger Wicker told Secretary of State Rubio and Treasury Secretary Bessent that "the majority of the Act's provisions go into effect on October 18th." This is their characterization, not AA's independent count. They urged the administration to:

Use European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK) and Group of Seven (G7) designations, official listings for sanctions, as a baseline for U.S. blacklisting. They noted the EU and UK have designated over 600 "shadow fleet" tankers, ships used to evade oil sanctions, compared with 216 for the United States.

Enforce the Act's ban, written into law, on new U.S. investment in Russia and on dealing in Russian sovereign debt, meaning government debt.

Use "mandatory secondary sanctions", required restrictions on third parties, against suppliers to Russia's military industry.

The House Rules Committee record shows a 3-to-7 vote rejecting an amendment that would have limited waivers to cases "vital to the national security of the United States." That failed proposal differs from the enacted "national interests" standard.

The fine print

Section 4 of the order waives duties under sections 112 and 113 . Section 113 contains the third-country conditions described above.

Specified sanctions or restrictions in sections 102(a), 102(d), 102(e), and 103 through 111 are waived. Only subsections 102(a), 102(d) and 102(e) are expressly waived, not section 102 in its entirety; the senators' baseline request concerns section 102. Sections 102(b), 102(c), 114, 115 and 116 are not expressly waived.

Section 117 is the separately waived termination and congressional-review procedure, not a sanction. Title II extends the Iran Sanctions Act and is not waived.

Section 115 supplies the certification and report requirement. Section 3 of the order directs continued monitoring.

Asymmetric Analysis: what changes, and what does not

While the waiver lasts, the duties and specified sanctions and restrictions listed above are not applied. The termination procedure is separately waived. The order preserves the specified pre-existing harmful-foreign-activities measures as they stood on September 17.

All else equal, the waiver removes an immediate Act-based duty risk for a country whose purchases and status would qualify. That does not mean buyers will purchase more. Discounts, shipping, insurance, domestic politics and other sanctions still matter.

This order alone does not show that oil or diesel prices will fall, or establish a pricing effect on any company or asset. Many forces shape prices. AA draws neither conclusion.

The counter-case: the waiver does not repeal the law, but the tariff without a waiver was never a single automatic fixed charge. Rates have legal ceilings, and administrative decisions and reporting are required. Continued monitoring remains directed. Revocability may preserve the ability to change policy; calling that negotiating leverage is a thesis, not an observed effect. The documents give no empirical base rate, a record of comparable outcomes, for how long this waiver will last.

What the evidence does not show

The White House says it submitted the required certification and report. AA has not independently seen them or separate evidence of transmission, so the administration's stated reasons remain unknown.

The order does not name the five largest importers or the five facilitators of sanctions evasion.

The documents do not establish which countries meet the third-country conditions, whether affected parties consider the dormant duties credible, or how quickly all required steps could follow revocation.

They establish no effect on purchases, prices, shipping, insurance, production or asset values, and no general historical base rate for sanctions-waiver duration.

What we're watching

Whether the certification and report become public; congressional moves against the waivers; new designations by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the existing Russia program; Trade Representative monitoring; and Russian crude purchases by the largest buyers after October 18.

Sources

Executive: The White House, Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (Oct 16) .

Enacted law: U.S. Government Publishing Office, Public Law 119-111 (approved Sept 18) .

Congress: Senators Shaheen and Wicker, letter to Secretaries Rubio and Bessent (Oct 6) ; House Committee on Rules, Senate amendment to H.R. 5334 .

Statements by officials are reported as their own claims.