China Proposes Export Curbs on 40 AI, Biotech and Solar Technologies and Makes Exporters Register in the Meantime

Analysis

Beijing's commerce and science ministries want to add 23 AI, 5 biomedicine and 12 photovoltaic technologies to the list of know-how that cannot leave China, or can leave only with a licence. The list is still a draft, open for comment until November 15, but a registration duty for exporters started on October 16. The ministries say most AI can still be exported freely.

The one-minute reading

China has proposed adding 40 technologies to its export-control catalogue: 23 in artificial intelligence, 5 in biomedicine and 12 in photovoltaics. The list is not final, but Announcement 2026 No. 48 immediately requires exporters to register covered transfers before they occur. MOFCOM says 14 proposed items would be prohibited and 26 restricted, meaning licensed.

The measure controls know-how, including patents, licences and some technology embodied in equipment, rather than every product made with that know-how. MOFCOM says open-source work, academic publications, AI accessed through an application programming interface or cloud service, and most AI exports remain outside the proposed scope. If the final catalogue keeps the listed solar, biotech and locally deployed AI technologies, overseas projects that depend on Chinese processes or equipment could face additional licensing and delay. But no cited record shows that a deal has been blocked or a price has moved. The decisive evidence will be the final catalogue after November 15, guidance on overseas model deployment and company disclosures about registrations or licences.

The five-minute analysis

China's Ministry of Commerce, known as MOFCOM, and Ministry of Science and Technology issued Announcement 2026 No. 48 on October 16. It proposes revising the Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited and Restricted from Export, which governs transfers of Chinese know-how across the border. The draft adds 40 technologies: 23 involving large models, AI agents, computing clusters and information processing; 5 involving biomedicine; and 12 involving polysilicon, wafers and solar-cell manufacturing.

MOFCOM's explanation of the proposal divides those additions into 14 prohibited and 26 restricted items. A prohibited technology cannot be exported. A restricted technology needs a licence. The examples show that the categories are specific rather than a ban on whole industries: AI-driven malicious-code generation and mutation would be prohibited, while AI-assisted vulnerability discovery would be restricted; perovskite and tandem solar-module production would be prohibited, while polysilicon engineering for single lines of at least 30,000 tonnes a year would be restricted.

Although the catalogue remains a draft, one obligation has already begun. Exporters must register covered technology transfers before they occur, including unfinished exports already under way. The reported information includes the parties, destination, technology and intended use, and expected value. The announcement covers transfers such as assigning intellectual property to a foreign party, licensing Chinese-owned technology abroad or moving ownership or actual control to a foreign entity. It does not say whether registration itself can be refused or delay a transfer.

The legal mechanism comes from China's Foreign Trade Law . Article 20 authorizes the catalogue, Article 18 permits restrictions on grounds including national security and public health, and Article 21 requires a licence for restricted technology. The immediate registration therefore records activity while the government considers the final prohibited and restricted lists; it is not itself proof that every registered transfer will be stopped.

MOFCOM describes substantial boundaries. It says technology already public through open source or academic papers is excluded, and that calling a Chinese model through an application programming interface, app, website or software-as-a-service falls outside the large-model scope. A restricted model installed on a foreign customer's own servers could fall inside, while some deployment on a company's overseas cloud may qualify for automatic licensing. Products made with listed technology are generally outside the controls, but key solar equipment carrying the technology, and production lines exported with installation and commissioning, can be inside them.

The possible transmission differs by industry. If the solar items remain, overseas polysilicon, wafer or cell factories relying on Chinese processes or equipment could need licences, adding time and cost. In biomedicine, ownership transfers of platforms or targets could face more process than licensing structures, potentially changing how deals are arranged. For AI, locally installed restricted models could face licensing while cloud-delivered use remains outside the described scope. These are conditional mechanisms, not observed effects.

The counter-case is that the practical reach may be narrow. MOFCOM emphasizes technical thresholds, open-source exclusions, automatic licences and facilitation. A registration could prove to be mainly a reporting requirement. The number of catalogue entries says nothing about the share of exports affected, and the article has no processing-time data or evidence that a completed deal changed structure. A final list with broad categories, or confirmation that registrations can be refused, would make the measure more consequential. Removal of the solar items or a final text matching the ministry's narrow guidance would strengthen the counter-case.

Until those records appear, the immediate result is administrative: exporters must disclose the parties, destination, technology, intended use and expected value before a covered transfer. Whether that registration adds delay or becomes a route to refusal remains unanswered. Company disclosures about actual registrations, licences and changed deal structures would show how the system works in practice.

What changed

Forty technologies, three fields. The draft contains 40 proposed additions: 23 artificial-intelligence technologies (large models, AI agents, computing clusters and information processing), 5 biomedicine technologies (cell and gene therapy, small-nucleic-acid drugs, pathogenic microorganisms) and 12 photovoltaic technologies (polysilicon, silicon wafer and solar-cell manufacturing).

Fourteen banned, twenty-six licensed. In its spokesperson answers , MOFCOM said 14 items are proposed as "prohibited" and 26 as "restricted". Its examples include AI-driven malicious-code generation and mutation (prohibited), AI-assisted vulnerability discovery (restricted), perovskite and tandem solar-module production (prohibited) and polysilicon engineering technology for single lines of at least 30,000 tonnes a year (restricted).

Registration starts now. From the day of the announcement until the revised catalogue takes effect, exporters must register on a MOFCOM platform before exporting technology covered by the announcement's annex. Exports already under way but not finished are covered.

Comments close November 15. The public comment period runs from October 16 to November 15, 2026. The final list may differ from the draft.

How a technology export control works

This measure concerns technology transfers, including some transfers embodied in equipment. The announcement identifies registration situations involving sending know-how abroad: assigning a patent or other intellectual property to a foreign party, licensing a foreign party to use Chinese-owned technology, or moving ownership or actual control of the technology to a foreign entity. The announcement also permits MOFCOM to specify other situations requiring registration.

China's Foreign Trade Law , revised in December 2025 and in force since March 1, 2026, gives the commerce ministry power to draw up this catalogue (Article 20). It lets the state restrict technology exports on grounds that include national security and public health (Article 18), and it requires a licence for every "restricted" technology (Article 21). A "prohibited" technology may not be exported at all.

An analogy: the registration step works like a sign-in sheet at the door, filled in before the rules about who may leave are final. The analogy breaks down at one point: the announcement does not say whether a registration can be refused or can delay an export. It lists only what must be reported: the parties, the destination, the technology and its use, and the expected value.

What MOFCOM says is not covered

These are MOFCOM's own statements; the final legal text has not been published.

Most AI. MOFCOM said "the vast majority of AI technology can still be exported freely" (AA translation). Technology already public through open source or academic papers is excluded. Calling a Chinese model through an API, using it via an app or website, software-as-a-service and "lightweight" local deployment are outside the large-model scope. Deploying a restricted model locally overseas is inside it, although MOFCOM says an automatic licence may apply on the company's own overseas cloud in relatively controllable circumstances.

Biotech licensing. MOFCOM distinguishes platform licensing and outsourced R&D/manufacturing services, which it says are outside the proposed controls, from licensing relevant target-discovery and validation technology, which it says qualifies for automatic licensing.

Products. MOFCOM said products made with a listed technology are outside the scope. For solar, however, key and core equipment that carries listed technology is inside it, and exporting production lines with installation and commissioning requires a technology export licence.

Targeting. The ministry said the revision is routine and is "not aimed at any particular country, region or entity" (AA translation).

The causal chain

The draft catalogue and immediate registration mean Chinese firms must report listed know-how transfers before they happen.

Further effects depend on what appears in the final list:

Solar. If the final list keeps the photovoltaic items, then building polysilicon, wafer or cell factories abroad with Chinese process technology or equipment could need a licence. That could slow the timing and raise the cost of overseas solar manufacturing projects that rely on Chinese suppliers.

Biotech. If ownership transfers stay inside the registration scope, then deals that sell Chinese-developed therapy platforms or targets to foreign drug makers could face more process than deals that only license them. Licensing could become the preferred structure.

AI. If "local deployment overseas" of restricted models is read broadly, Chinese AI firms that install models on foreign customers' own servers could face licensing, while the ministry says API and cloud-delivered model use fall outside these large-model technology export controls.

What is not justified: these steps do not show that any deal has been blocked, that solar module or drug prices will move, or that the rule is aimed at a specific country. The comment period is still open, and the list of 40 items (Attachment 1) has not been reviewed by AA.

Worth knowing: The December 2023 catalogue includes rare-earth technology prohibitions. Its December 2023 edition, issued as Announcement 2023 No. 57 and reproduced by Hong Kong's Trade and Industry Department , lists rare-earth extraction and separation technology and the making of samarium-cobalt and neodymium-iron-boron magnets on the prohibited list.

Counter-case

The scope may be narrow in practice. MOFCOM stresses facilitation measures, automatic licensing, open-source exclusions and a promise to remove technologies that are no longer advanced. MOFCOM says most listed items carry specific technical indicators, such as the 30,000-tonne polysilicon line, which smaller transfers would not reach. A registration duty may end up being a reporting exercise with little effect on deal flow.

The count of catalogue entries does not measure the share of exports affected. AA has no denominator for covered transfers, processing-time data or evidence of completed deals changing structure.

What the evidence does not show

The full list of 40 items, which is in an attachment AA has not opened.

Whether registration gives authorities a power to stop or delay a transfer before the final catalogue takes effect.

When the revised catalogue will take effect.

Any measured effect on deals, company valuations or prices.

What we're watching

The final catalogue after the November 15 comment deadline, and whether the 14 prohibited and 26 restricted items survive unchanged.

MOFCOM guidance on what counts as "local deployment" of a large model abroad.

Company disclosures by solar-equipment makers and biotech licensors that mention the registration duty.

What would change our view

Publication of the full list with broad categories rather than thresholds, or a statement that registrations can be refused, would make the measure more consequential than MOFCOM describes. Removal of the solar items, or a final list close to the facilitation language, would support the counter-case.

Sources

MOFCOM/MOST Announcement 2026 No. 48 , October 16, 2026 (Chinese).

MOFCOM spokesperson answers on the catalogue revision , October 16, 2026 (Chinese).

Foreign Trade Law of the PRC , revised December 27, 2025, published by MOFCOM (Chinese).

Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department reproduction of the 2023 catalogue annex (Chinese).

Quotations from Chinese documents are Asymmetric Analytics translations. MOFCOM's descriptions of scope and intent are the ministry's own claims.