Chinese renminbi
Updated
Summary
The renminbi (RMB, 'people's currency'; unit: yuan, code CNY) is China's fiat currency, issued by the People's Bank of China (PBOC). It runs a managed float: each morning the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) publishes a central parity, or fixing, under PBOC authorisation, and onshore spot trading is held within 2% either side of it. On 2026-10-20 the fixing was 6.7200 yuan per US dollar, after the onshore rate rose 3.0% against the dollar in the first half of 2026, per SAFE. Capital controls separate the onshore market (CNY) from the offshore market (CNH), centred on Hong Kong. Internationally the RMB is a big trading currency but a small reserve one. It is 8.5% of global FX turnover (BIS, April 2025) and 12.28% of the IMF's SDR basket. Yet it is only 2.11% of reported official reserves (IMF COFER, Q2 2026) and 2.73% of SWIFT payments (December 2025). The e-CNY is the PBOC's retail digital form of the currency. It is not a crypto token or an investable asset, and since 2026-01-01 balances in bank wallets earn interest as deposits owed by the bank.
Key numbers
USD/CNY central parity (fixing): 6.7200 yuan per dollar (672.00 per 100 USD) (as of 2026-10-20). Source: safe.gov.cn
CNY change vs USD, H1 2026 (onshore / offshore CNH); CFETS basket: +3.0% / +2.7%; CFETS index +4.7% (as of 2026-06-30). Source: safe.gov.cn
Foreign-currency reserves: USD 3,400.25 billion (USD 3,438.33 billion end-August) (as of 2026-09-30). Source: safe.gov.cn
Current-account surplus, H1 2026: USD 378.0 billion (3.7% of GDP) (as of 2026-06-30). Source: safe.gov.cn
China 10-year government bond yield (1-year 1.18%): 1.65% (as of 2026-10-19). Source: yield.chinabond.com.cn
US federal funds target range (for the rate gap): 3.75-4.00% (as of 2026-09-16). Source: federalreserve.gov
IMF staff-assessed REER gap for China, 2025: -21.3% midpoint (range -17.3% to -25.3%), i.e. undervalued (as of 2025-12-31). Source: imf.org
RMB share of reported official FX reserves (COFER): 2.11% (Q1 1.98%) (as of 2026-06-30). Source: data.imf.org
RMB weight in the IMF SDR basket: 12.28% (as of 2022-08-01). Source: imf.org
RMB share of global OTC FX turnover (out of 200%): 8.5% (as of 2025-04-30). Source: bis.org
RMB share of global payments by value (SWIFT), rank: 2.73%, 6th (as of 2025-12-31). Source: swift.com
RMB share of China's goods-trade cross-border receipts and payments: 28.1% (H1 2025; 27.2% in 2024) (as of 2025-06-30). Source: camlmac.pbc.gov.cn
Timeline
2026-10-20 — USD/CNY central parity set at 6.7200, the strongest of the October fixings listed by SAFE. (Source: safe.gov.cn)
2026-10-19 — NBS: Q3 GDP +4.5% y/y; January-September exports +16.4% and imports +22.3% in yuan. (Source: stats.gov.cn)
2026-10-07 — SAFE: foreign-currency reserves fell to USD 3,400.25 billion at end-September; gold holdings rose to 77.47 million ounces. (Source: safe.gov.cn)
2026-09-30 — IMF COFER: renminbi share of reported reserves rises to 2.11% in Q2 2026. (Source: data.imf.org)
2026-09-29 — SAFE H1 BoP report: CNY up 3.0% against the dollar in H1; current-account surplus USD 378.0 billion. (Source: safe.gov.cn)
2026-09-20 — SAFE: August bank FX settlement exceeds sales by about USD 48.5 billion (AA subtraction). (Source: safe.gov.cn)
2026-09-19 — PBOC MPC Q3 meeting: 'moderately accommodative' policy; RMB 'basically stable at a reasonable and balanced level'. (Source: jrj.sh.gov.cn)
2026-09-16 — Federal Reserve raises the federal funds target range by 0.25 point to 3.75-4.00%. (Source: federalreserve.gov)
2026-07-23 — US Treasury FX report: China stays on the Monitoring List, not designated a manipulator; flags undisclosed intervention. (Source: home.treasury.gov)
2026-07-22 — IMF Board discusses the 2026 External Sector Report: China's REER gap midpoint -21.3%. (Source: imf.org)
2026-07-14 — CIPS: 210 direct and 1,619 indirect participants as of June 2026. (Source: cips.com.cn)
2026-07-01 — IMF COFER: renminbi share of reported reserves 1.99% in Q1 2026 (later revised to 1.98%). (Source: data.imf.org)
2026-01-01 — e-CNY switches to an interest-bearing 'digital deposit money' model held as bank liabilities. (Source: gov.cn)
2025-11-30 — CIPS: 190 direct and 1,567 indirect participants at end-November 2025. (Source: cips.com.cn)
2025-09-30 — BIS Triennial Survey preliminary results: renminbi share of FX turnover rises to 8.5%. (Source: bis.org)
Key actors and links
People’s Bank of China (actor:peoples-bank-of-china): Manages the float: sets the daily fix through CFETS within a 2% band, runs swap lines and CIPS, issues e-CNY policy.
China (country:china): Issuer economy: Q3 2026 GDP +4.5%, a USD 378.0 billion H1 current-account surplus and USD 3.4 trillion of FX reserves.
US dollar (asset:usd): Main counter-currency: the fix is quoted against it and the dollar is on up to 96% of CNY trades (BIS).
Federal Reserve (actor:federal-reserve): Fed funds at 3.75-4.00% versus a 1.65% Chinese 10-year yield set the rate gap that weighs on the yuan.
U.S. Treasury (actor:us-treasury): Keeps China on its FX Monitoring List and says it will name China if it finds intervention against appreciation.
International Monetary Fund (actor:imf): Puts the RMB at 12.28% of the SDR, tracks its 2.11% reserve share and estimates a -21.3% REER gap.
BIS (actor:bis): Triennial Survey: renminbi at 8.5% of global FX turnover in April 2025.
SWIFT (actor:swift): RMB 6th in global payments by value at 2.73% in December 2025.
Foreign exchange reserves (theme:foreign-exchange-reserves): China holds USD 3,400.25 billion of FX reserves; the RMB is only 2.11% of other countries' reported reserves.
Trade balance (theme:trade-balance): The goods surplus (USD 526.3 billion in H1 2026, BoP basis) is the main source of FX inflows into the RMB.
De-dollarization (theme:de-dollarization): CIPS growth and a 28.1% RMB share in China's goods-trade settlement are the RMB's main de-dollarization channels.
CBDC (theme:cbdc): e-CNY is China's CBDC; since 2026-01-01 bank-wallet balances are interest-bearing bank liabilities, not an investable token.
mBridge (actor:mbridge): Multi-CBDC bridge: 387.2 billion yuan equivalent of payments by end-November 2025, about 95.3% in e-CNY.
Saudi-China Currency Swap (event:saudi-china-currency-swap): 50 billion yuan / 26 billion riyal swap signed 2023-11-20 for three years.
Hong Kong dollar (asset:hkd): Hong Kong is the main offshore (CNH) centre; HKD fix 85.628 yuan per 100 HKD on 2026-10-20.
Why it matters now
The yuan is strengthening against a large rate gap. Usually lower Chinese yields pull money out: the 10-year government bond yielded 1.65% on 2026-10-19 and the 1-year loan prime rate is 3.0%, while the Fed raised its target to 3.75-4.00% on 2026-09-16. Trade inflows are winning instead. SAFE reports a USD 378.0 billion current-account surplus in H1 2026 (3.7% of GDP), and banks bought about USD 48.5 billion more FX from clients than they sold in August (AA subtraction from SAFE data). NBS reports January-September exports up 16.4% in yuan, though imports grew faster (22.3%). The fixing moved from 7.34 per dollar at the April 2025 low (US Treasury) to 6.83 at end-April 2026 and 6.72 on 2026-10-20 (SAFE). The PBOC's 2026-09-19 statement still targets a rate 'basically stable at a reasonable and balanced level'.
The open dispute is how much the authorities are leaning against appreciation. US Treasury says the PBOC has set the fix weaker than market expectations since December 2025. It notes that Chinese banks' net foreign assets rose USD 367 billion in 2025 (Treasury suspects state banks are intermediating the surplus), and that China alone among covered economies does not disclose intervention. The IMF's July 2026 External Sector Report puts the real effective exchange rate 17.3-25.3% below its estimated equilibrium. Internationalisation is advancing through trade settlement and plumbing rather than reserves. The RMB's share of China's goods-trade settlement was 28.1% in H1 2025 (PBOC), and CIPS had 210 direct participants by June 2026. Whether 2026 oil trade linked to the Iran war is invoiced in yuan is UNKNOWN: AA found no primary data on it.
Risks and open questions
Bull case: Fundamentals favour a gradually stronger and more used RMB. The current-account surplus is 3.7% of GDP, and the IMF judges the currency undervalued by a midpoint of 21.3%. Foreign investors resumed net buying of Chinese bonds from May 2026 (SAFE). China is a net external creditor of USD 3.8 trillion with USD 3.4 trillion of FX reserves, so a disorderly fall is hard to engineer. Use is rising where China controls the plumbing: 28.1% of goods-trade settlement, 175 trillion yuan through CIPS in 2024, 32 swap lines worth over 4.5 trillion yuan, and an FX-turnover share up from 7.0% to 8.8% (BIS QR basis).
Bear case: The RMB is still a managed, capital-controlled currency. Reserve managers hold only 2.11% of reported reserves in it, little changed despite a decade in the SDR, and the dollar is on as much as 96% of CNY trades. Chinese yields of 1.18% (1-year) and 1.65% (10-year) against a fed funds target of 3.75-4.00% reward holding dollars, and further PBOC easing would widen that gap. Appreciation from the trade surplus can be absorbed by state banks and the fixing rather than passed to holders. The US Treasury could escalate if it judges the authorities are resisting appreciation. Weak domestic demand (retail sales +1.1% in September, NBS) argues for looser policy, not a stronger yuan.
Falsifiers: - Bull case fails if the fixing weakens back above 7.0 per dollar without a fall in the trade surplus, or if foreign bond holdings drop again for several months. - Bull case fails if the RMB's COFER reserve share falls back below 2% in the Q3 or Q4 2026 releases. - Bear case fails if the PBOC publishes intervention data showing no net FX purchases while CNY keeps rising. - Bear case fails if the PBOC cuts the LPR and CNY still appreciates against the dollar over the following quarter. - The managed-appreciation reading fails if the US Treasury's next FX report finds China's intervention neither persistent nor one-sided on both of its proxies.
Value accrual gate: This is a fiat currency, not a token. A holder's return is the currency move plus the yuan interest rate earned (for example 1.18% on 1-year government bonds). Trade-settlement and CIPS growth help holders only if they raise demand for yuan assets enough to lift the exchange rate or lower Chinese funding costs. The e-CNY is not investable. Bank-wallet balances are bank deposits earning deposit rates, so no separate token or holder claim captures e-CNY adoption.
What to watch
Monthly loan prime rate fixing (published on the 20th, or next business day) and any PBOC policy-rate cut that would widen the gap with the Fed. (2026-11-20 and monthly); Source: chinamoney.com.cn
Renewal or lapse of the PBOC-Saudi Central Bank swap, signed 2023-11-20 for three years; no renewal announcement found. (around 2026-11-20 (three-year term)); Source: english.www.gov.cn
IMF SDR valuation review, which resets the renminbi's 12.28% weight. (by end-July 2027); Source: imf.org
Whether daily fixings keep coming in weaker than market expectations as CNY strengthens past 6.72 (the Treasury's 'leaning against appreciation' signal). (no scheduled date); speculative, no scheduled source
Next US Treasury FX report: any designation of China or tougher language on undisclosed intervention. (no scheduled date (semi-annual; next date not verified)); speculative, no scheduled source
IMF COFER Q3 2026 release: does the RMB reserve share hold above 2%? (late December 2026 (date not verified)); speculative, no scheduled source
SAFE end-October reserves and October FX settlement data. (early to mid November 2026 (date not verified)); speculative, no scheduled source
AA inference
Inference (AA): the renminbi is the graph's main policy-managed price between China's export engine and the rest of the world. A large surplus pushes it up, a negative rate gap with the US pushes it down, and the PBOC fixing, state-bank FX buying and capital controls decide how much of the push shows up in the price. AA reads the 2025-26 pattern (fix weaker than expected, rising bank foreign assets, reserves broadly flat near USD 3.4 trillion) as managed, gradual appreciation rather than a free float. This node moves its neighbours through three channels: export competitiveness and trade friction (US Treasury monitoring, tariffs), dollar-share statistics (COFER, SWIFT, CIPS) behind de-dollarization claims, and the sizing of PBOC easing. The thesis weakens if the PBOC publishes intervention data showing no FX purchases, or if CNY falls sharply despite the surplus.
Sources
The USD/CNY central parity (the daily fixing published by CFETS under PBOC authorisation, shown on SAFE's query page) was 672.00 yuan per 100 US dollars (6.7200) on 2026-10-20, from 673.51 on 2026-09-30 and 673.67 on 2026-10-08. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE's central-parity table for 2026-10-20 shows 751.59 yuan per 100 euros, 4.2327 yuan per 100 yen and 85.628 yuan per 100 Hong Kong dollars. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE's H1 2026 balance-of-payments report (2026-09-29): onshore CNY appreciated 3.0% and offshore CNH 2.7% against the US dollar in H1 2026; the CFETS currency-basket index rose 4.7% and the BIS nominal effective index 5.5%; CNY rose on 64 of 116 trading days. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE: China's current-account surplus was USD 378.0 billion in H1 2026, 3.7% of GDP, with a goods surplus of USD 526.3 billion on a balance-of-payments basis; SAFE says goods-surplus growth slowed noticeably from 2025. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE: in H1 2026 the non-reserve financial account had a net outflow of USD 222.8 billion and direct investment a net outflow of USD 15.8 billion (outward USD 76.7 billion, inward USD 60.9 billion). (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE: in H1 2026 foreigners' Chinese debt-securities holdings fell by a net USD 42.0 billion, turning to net purchases from May; foreign equity inflows were USD 53.7 billion; foreign holdings of Chinese bonds were USD 669.0 billion at end-June 2026. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE official reserve assets table: foreign-currency reserves were USD 3,400.25 billion at end-September 2026, down from USD 3,438.33 billion at end-August; gold rose to 77.47 million ounces (USD 323.52 billion); total official reserve assets were USD 3,789.43 billion. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE: at end-June 2026 China's external financial assets were USD 12,180.4 billion and liabilities USD 8,355.5 billion, a net creditor position of USD 3,824.9 billion; reserve assets were USD 3,786.3 billion. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
SAFE (released 2026-09-20): in August 2026 banks' FX settlement was USD 251.8 billion and FX sales USD 203.3 billion (net settlement surplus USD 48.5 billion, AA subtraction); client cross-border receipts were USD 776.8 billion and payments USD 714.4 billion. (Source: safe.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
The PBOC Monetary Policy Committee's Q3 2026 meeting on 2026-09-19 kept a 'moderately accommodative' stance and said FX supply and demand were basically balanced and the RMB 'fluctuates in both directions' while staying 'basically stable at a reasonable and balanced level' (statement attributed to the PBOC, Shanghai government copy, AA translation). (Source: jrj.sh.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
The National Interbank Funding Center, authorised by the PBOC, published a 1-year loan prime rate of 3.0% and a 5-year-plus rate of 3.5% on 2026-09-20. (Source: chinamoney.com.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
ChinaBond's MOF China government bond yield curve showed a 10-year yield of 1.65% and a 1-year yield of 1.18% on 2026-10-19. (Source: yield.chinabond.com.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
The Federal Reserve raised the federal funds target range by 0.25 point to 3.75-4.00% on 2026-09-16. (Source: federalreserve.gov, accessed 2026-10-20)
US Treasury's July 2026 FX report (released 2026-07-23) did not designate China a currency manipulator but kept it on the Monitoring List; China met the bilateral-surplus criterion (USD 169 billion goods and services surplus with the US in 2025) and the current-account criterion (3.8% of GDP). (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-20)
US Treasury: the RMB appreciated 4.4% against the dollar in 2025, from a low of 7.34 per dollar in April 2025 to 6.99 at end-2025 and 6.83 at end-April 2026, while depreciating 3.4% against the CFETS basket in 2025. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-20)
US Treasury: China is 'the only economy covered in this Report that does not disclose its foreign exchange market intervention'; its proxies conflict (PBOC FX-asset data show USD 105 billion of sales, net FX settlement data USD 323 billion of purchases), and banks' net foreign assets rose USD 367 billion in 2025. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-20)
US Treasury: the RMB trades within a 2% band around the daily fix; the PBOC set the fix substantially stronger than market forecasts from January to early May 2025 and, after December 2025, weaker than market expectations, leaning against appreciation. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-20)
IMF 2026 External Sector Report (July 2026): China's 2025 external position was 'stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies'; current account 3.8% of GDP, CA gap 3.0% of GDP, and a staff-assessed REER gap of -17.3% to -25.3% (midpoint -21.3%). (Source: imf.org, accessed 2026-10-20)
IMF 2026 ESR: capital-flow management measures should not substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment and exchange-rate flexibility, and China should phase them out gradually, sequenced with greater exchange-rate flexibility. (Source: imf.org, accessed 2026-10-20)
IMF COFER (published 2026-09-30): the renminbi's share of reported official FX reserves was 2.11% in Q2 2026, up from 1.98% in Q1; the US dollar was 56.70% and the euro 20.60%, of total reserves of USD 13.22 trillion. (Source: data.imf.org, accessed 2026-10-20)
IMF SDR valuation review (2022-05-14): the renminbi weight in the SDR basket was set at 12.28% (US dollar 43.38%, euro 29.31%, yen 7.59%, sterling 7.44%), effective 2022-08-01; the next review is to conclude by end-July 2027. (Source: imf.org, accessed 2026-10-20)
BIS Triennial Survey (preliminary results released 2025-09-30): global OTC FX turnover was USD 9.6 trillion a day in April 2025; the renminbi's share rose to 8.5% of turnover (out of 200%) and USD/CNY trading rose 59%. (Source: bis.org, accessed 2026-10-20)
BIS Quarterly Review (December 2025): CNY was the most traded emerging-market currency at 8.8% of global turnover in April 2025, up from 7.0% in 2022; USD/CNY overtook USD/GBP as the third most traded pair, and the dollar is the counterparty in as much as 96% of CNY trades. (Source: bis.org, accessed 2026-10-20)
SWIFT RMB Tracker (January 2026): in December 2025 the RMB was the 6th most active currency for global payments by value with a 2.73% share, and 6th with 2.13% when payments within the euro area are excluded. (Source: swift.com, accessed 2026-10-20)
PBOC 2025 RMB Internationalization Report: cross-border RMB receipts and payments were 64.1 trillion yuan in 2024 (+22.6%); the RMB's share of goods-trade cross-border receipts and payments was 27.2% in 2024 and 28.1% in H1 2025. (Source: camlmac.pbc.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
PBOC 2025 RMB Internationalization Report: CIPS processed 175 trillion yuan in 2024 (+43%); 32 PBOC bilateral swap lines were in force at end-June 2025 totalling over 4.5 trillion yuan; foreign holdings of onshore RMB financial assets were about 10.4 trillion yuan. (Source: camlmac.pbc.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
CIPS Participants Announcement No. 118 (2026-07-14): as of June 2026 CIPS had 210 direct and 1,619 indirect participants, up from 190 direct and 1,567 indirect at end-November 2025 (Announcement No. 115). (Source: cips.com.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
gov.cn (Xinhua, 2025-12-29, relaying the PBOC): from 2026-01-01 the e-CNY moved from a 'digital cash' to a 'digital deposit money' model; banks pay interest on real-name wallet balances, which deposit insurance protects like deposits, and Deputy Governor Lu Lei describes bank-wallet balances as liabilities of the commercial bank. Cumulative e-CNY transactions were 16.7 trillion yuan at end-November 2025. (Source: gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
gov.cn (2023-11-20): the PBOC and the Saudi Central Bank signed a 50 billion yuan (26 billion riyal) bilateral currency swap, valid for three years and extendable by mutual consent. (Source: english.www.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)
NBS (2026-10-19): China's GDP grew 4.5% y/y in Q3 2026; January-September goods exports were 23,197.9 billion yuan (+16.4%) and imports 16,742.0 billion yuan (+22.3%). (Source: stats.gov.cn, accessed 2026-10-20)