Iranian oil exports

Updated 2026-10-18

Summary

Iranian oil exports are Iran's sales of crude oil and condensate abroad. Under U.S. sanctions almost all of it went to China. EIA estimates, from tanker tracking, that Iran exported about 1.58 mb/d in 2025, worth about US$48 billion before discounts, and assigns about 1.57 mb/d of it to China. Most buyers were China's independent 'teapot' refiners in Shandong, and cargoes often moved on a 'shadow fleet' that relabels cargoes and transfers them ship to ship. Kharg Island is Iran's Gulf loading terminal in the Persian Gulf, upstream of the Strait of Hormuz. Since a U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports began in April 2026, the U.S. government says exports have stopped.

Key numbers

Crude and condensate exports, 2025 average (EIA estimate from Vortexa tanker tracking): about 1.58 mb/d (1.45 mb/d in 2024) (as of 2025-12-31). Source: eia.gov

Exports assessed as going to China, 2025 (EIA): about 1.57 mb/d, nearly all of the total (as of 2025-12-31). Source: eia.gov

Crude and condensate export revenue, 2025 (EIA, before discounts): about US$48 billion (US$49 billion in 2024) (as of 2025-12-31). Source: eia.gov

China's share of Iran's oil exports (OFAC alert): about 90%, mostly via teapot refiners (as of 2026-04-28). Source: home.treasury.gov

Iran crude supply: February / September 2026 (IEA): 3.68 mb/d / 1.94 mb/d (as of 2026-09-30). Source: iea.org

Iran crude production: February 2026 / 3Q26 (EIA): 3.39 mb/d / 2.30 mb/d (as of 2026-09-30). Source: eia.gov

Sustainable crude capacity (IEA): 3.8 mb/d (as of 2026-08-31). Source: iea.org

Goureh-Jask bypass pipeline: nameplate / actual (EIA): 1.0 mb/d / about 0.3 mb/d (as of 2024-06-30). Source: eia.gov

Iranian oil exports since the blockade resumed (White House, citing CENTCOM; party claim): zero (as of 2026-08-28). Source: whitehouse.gov

First blockade, 2026-04-13 to 06-18: vessels redirected / disabled (CENTCOM): more than 140 / 9 (as of 2026-06-18). Source: centcom.mil

Timeline

2026-10-15 — Treasury designates an NIOC oil trustee who shipped oil before 'the U.S. blockade preventing Iranian oil exports'. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-10-14 — IEA puts Iran's September crude supply at 1.94 mb/d, down from 2.16 mb/d in August. (Source: iea.org)

2026-10-08 — Treasury sanctions 17 shadow-fleet vessels and describes Iranian shipments outside the blockade line as 'dwindling'. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-10-06 — EIA's October STEO puts Iran's 3Q26 crude output at 2.30 mb/d and assumes Middle East flows stay constrained through 4Q26. (Source: eia.gov)

2026-10-01 — Treasury says Iran's oil revenues are falling to zero as the blockade takes hold (Treasury claim). (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-09-05 — After IRGC missiles target two U.S. warships, CENTCOM disables tankers off Kharg and near Jask and destroys a third. (Source: centcom.mil)

2026-08-28 — The White House, citing CENTCOM, says Iran has exported zero oil since the blockade resumed (party claim). (Source: whitehouse.gov)

2026-07-15 — CENTCOM disables the unladen tanker Belma heading to Kharg Island, the first ship stopped under the renewed blockade. (Source: centcom.mil)

2026-07-14 — The U.S. blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas resumes. (Source: centcom.mil)

2026-07-10 — IEA says the U.S. temporarily lifted restrictions on Iranian exports in June, helping Gulf exports recover. (Source: iea.org)

2026-06-17 — IEA says Iranian exports can fully resume once the U.S. blockade is lifted; Iran's May supply was 2.30 mb/d. (Source: iea.org)

2026-06-10 — CENTCOM disables the tanker Jalveer in the Gulf of Oman for trying to move petroleum out of Iran. (Source: centcom.mil)

2026-05-11 — Treasury designates 12 targets enabling IRGC oil sales to China. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-05-07 — OFAC designates Iraq's deputy oil minister over Iranian oil passed off as Iraqi. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-05-04 — CENTCOM's commander says the blockade has been '100% effective' (party claim). (Source: centcom.mil)

2026-04-28 — OFAC warns banks about China's teapot refiners, which it says take most of Iran's oil. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-04-24 — OFAC sanctions the Hengli (Dalian) teapot refinery and 19 shadow-fleet vessels. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

2026-04-13 — The first U.S. blockade of Iranian ports begins; it runs to 2026-06-18. (Source: centcom.mil)

2025-04-16 — OFAC sanctions Shandong Shengxing, a teapot refinery it says bought over US$1 billion of Iranian crude. (Source: home.treasury.gov)

Key actors and links

Iran (country:iran): The exporter: NIOC and, per Treasury, IRGC-linked networks sell the crude; exports were about 1.58 mb/d in 2025 by EIA's estimate.

China (country:china): The near-sole buyer: EIA assigns about 1.57 mb/d of 2025 exports to China, mostly bought by independent refiners in Shandong.

United States (country:united-states): Has blockaded Iranian ports since 2026-07-14 (first round 2026-04-13 to 06-18) and sanctions buyers, ships and financiers.

U.S. Central Command (actor:us-central-command): Enforces the blockade, disables blockade-running tankers and claims Iranian exports have stopped; its figures are a party's claims.

U.S. Treasury (actor:us-treasury): OFAC designates teapot refiners, shadow-fleet tankers, oil trustees and banks, and says Iran's oil revenues are falling to zero.

U.S. Department of State (actor:us-department-of-state): Adds parallel Iran oil and shadow-fleet designations alongside Treasury's actions.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (actor:irgc): Treasury says the IRGC sells and ships part of Iran's oil to China; CENTCOM calls the tankers it struck in September IRGC assets.

Kharg Island (place:kharg-island): Iran's Gulf crude loading terminal, where CENTCOM disabled the Downy on 2026-09-05; its share of exports is UNKNOWN on a primary source.

Strait of Hormuz (place:strait-of-hormuz): Every Kharg cargo must pass the strait; Jask, east of it, is Iran's partial bypass at about 0.3 mb/d of pipeline capacity (EIA, 2024).

2026 Iran war (event:2026-iran-war): The war and the blockade it produced cut Iran's crude supply from 3.68 mb/d in February to 1.94 mb/d in September (IEA).

US strikes on three Iranian oil tankers, 2026-09-05 (event:2026-09-05-us-strikes-on-iranian-tankers): CENTCOM disabled two Iranian tankers and destroyed a third on 2026-09-05.

US blockade enforcement (theme:us-blockade-enforcement): Inference (AA): the blockade appears to be the main constraint on export volumes since July 2026, but actual exports are unknown.

Crude oil (commodity:crude-oil): Iranian barrels were about 1.6 mb/d of world seaborne crude in 2025; their loss is part of the Gulf supply shock.

Iraq (country:iraq): OFAC alleges Iranian oil was blended with and sold as Iraqi crude, a channel the May 2026 designations targeted.

Malaysia (country:malaysia): EIA treats exports logged to Malaysia as likely bound for China, a sign of relabelling and ship-to-ship transfers.

Why it matters now

Inference (AA): the blockade appears to have replaced sanctions as the main limit on volumes, but actual exports are unknown. It ran from 2026-04-13 to 2026-06-18, was briefly eased under the June deal, and has run again since 2026-07-14. The White House, citing CENTCOM, says Iran has exported zero oil since then, and Treasury says Iran's oil revenues are falling to zero. These are claims by a party to the war. Treasury's own wording on 2026-10-08 was less absolute: it described Iranian shipments outside the blockade line as 'dwindling'. No Iranian official export figure and no Chinese customs figure for Iranian crude was found, so actual volumes since July are UNKNOWN. Output has fallen: the IEA puts Iran's crude supply at 3.68 mb/d in February and 1.94 mb/d in September 2026.

Pressure is on every link of the chain at once. OFAC sanctioned the Hengli (Dalian) refinery in April and warned banks about teapot refiners. It has also hit shadow-fleet tankers, IRGC oil sellers, an NIOC oil trustee, and an Iraqi official accused of passing Iranian oil off as Iraqi. CENTCOM has disabled tankers bound to or from Iranian ports, including off Kharg Island on 2026-09-05.

Risks and open questions

Bull case: Recovery case (for Iranian export volumes). The IEA said in June that Iranian exports can fully resume once the blockade is lifted. In June the U.S. briefly eased restrictions and Gulf exports jumped. Iran keeps 3.8 mb/d of sustainable capacity and still produced 1.94 mb/d in September, so oil is available. The buyer network in China has survived years of sanctions, and EIA's data show exports rose every year from 2020 to 2025 despite U.S. pressure. Inference (AA): a deal that ends the blockade would restore volumes faster than sanctions alone could stop them, because the teapot and shadow-fleet channel already exists.

Bear case: Squeeze case. The blockade, by U.S. account, has cut exports to zero, and Treasury says it has neutralized most of the remaining shadow fleet. OFAC is now targeting the refiners and banks in China, not only the ships, and threatens secondary sanctions on foreign banks. The Jask bypass carried only about 0.3 mb/d in 2024, so Iran has little route around a blockade inside the Gulf. Inference (AA): even after a deal, sanctions and buyers' compliance risk could keep exports below the 2025 level of about 1.58 mb/d for some time.

Falsifiers: - The 'zero exports' claim is falsified if EIA, IEA or OPEC data show sustained Iranian crude exports since 2026-07-14. - The squeeze case weakens if the IEA's monthly Iran supply recovers above 2.5 mb/d while the blockade is still in force. - The recovery case weakens if Iran's crude supply keeps falling below 1.94 mb/d in the IEA's November and December reports with no talks under way. - The recovery case weakens if, after a blockade is lifted, Chinese teapot buying does not resume within a few months because of secondary sanctions. - The blockade thesis weakens if independent data show sustained exports near the 2025 level while enforcement remains in force. - The leakage reading is falsified if Treasury designations stop naming new Iranian oil shipments after July 2026.

What to watch

EIA November STEO: Iran's 4Q26 production and the Middle East flow assumption. (2026-11-10); Source: eia.gov

Further Operation Economic Outcast designations of tankers, refiners, trustees and banks. (no scheduled date); Source: home.treasury.gov

IEA November Oil Market Report: Iran's October crude supply against 1.94 mb/d. (mid-November 2026); speculative, no scheduled source

OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report secondary-source estimate of Iran's output (not readable in this pass). (mid-November 2026); speculative, no scheduled source

CENTCOM publication of a blocked-export estimate with its method and measurement period. (no scheduled date); speculative, no scheduled source

Any U.S.-Iran deal that lifts or suspends the blockade, as in June 2026. (no scheduled date); speculative, no scheduled source

EIA's next annual SHIP Act report with 2026 export and revenue estimates. (mid-2027); speculative, no scheduled source

AA inference

Inference (AA): this node is the cash channel between Iran's oil and the rest of the graph. Blockade and sanctions can cut volumes, reducing Iran's foreign currency and budget and weighing on the rial. Iran still produced 1.94 mb/d in September; because exports are unknown, the split among exports, domestic refining and storage is also UNKNOWN. If independently measured exports stay low and storage fills, output would likely fall further. If the blockade lifts, the IEA expects exports to resume, which would add back sour Gulf barrels quickly.

Sources

EIA's June 2026 report to Congress under the SHIP Act estimates, from Vortexa tanker tracking, that Iran exported about 1.58 mb/d of crude oil and condensate in 2025 (1.45 mb/d in 2024, 1.28 mb/d in 2023), and says nearly all of its figures are estimates rather than actual data. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's June 2026 SHIP Act report assigns 1.57 mb/d of Iran's 2025 crude and condensate exports to China, up from 1.12 mb/d in 2023; it treats volumes reported as going to Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam or 'unknown' as likely bound for China from 2020 onward. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's June 2026 SHIP Act report estimates Iran's crude and condensate export revenue at about US$48 billion in 2025 and US$49 billion in 2024 (nominal), excluding discounts and refined products. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's June 2026 SHIP Act report says operators may relabel cargoes as originating from countries other than Iran, carry out illicit ship-to-ship transfers and switch off identification signals, and that media reports suggest Chinese buyers are mostly small independent refineries. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's Iran country analysis brief (last updated 2024-10-10) says China took nearly 90% of Iran's crude and condensate exports in 2023 and that China's independent refineries, mainly in Shandong province, bought most of Iran's exports over the previous three years. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's 2024 Iran brief says Iran is building the Jask export terminal east of the Strait of Hormuz, and that the Goureh-Jask pipeline, with 1.0 mb/d nameplate capacity, could carry only about 300,000 b/d as of mid-2024. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's July 2025 OPEC revenue fact sheet, a pre-war forecast based on the June 2025 STEO, projected Iran's crude and condensate export revenue at US$34 billion in 2025 and US$29 billion in 2026, and says the figures do not account for discounts Iran offers buyers. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's October 2026 STEO table 3d puts Iran's crude production at 3.38 mb/d in 2025, 3.35 mb/d in 1Q26, 2.81 mb/d in 2Q26 and 2.30 mb/d in 3Q26. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's October 2026 STEO Table 1 lists Iran's crude production at 3,390 thousand b/d in February 2026, before war-related disruptions. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

EIA's October 2026 STEO, released 2026-10-06, assumes that oil flows from the Middle East remain constrained through 4Q26; the next STEO is due 2026-11-10. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's October 2026 Oil Market Report (2026-10-14) lists Iran's crude supply at 1.94 mb/d in September 2026 and 2.16 mb/d in August, with Iran exempt from OPEC+ cuts. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's September 2026 Oil Market Report lists Iran's crude supply at 2.72 mb/d in July and 2.16 mb/d in August 2026, against sustainable capacity of 3.8 mb/d. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's April 2026 Oil Market Report lists Iran's crude supply at 3.68 mb/d in February and 3.63 mb/d in March 2026, and flags the announced U.S. blockade of vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports and coastal areas. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's June 2026 Oil Market Report lists Iran's crude supply at 3.36 mb/d in April and 2.30 mb/d in May 2026, and says Iranian oil exports can 'fully resume once the US blockade is lifted' under the interim U.S.-Iran deal. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's June 2026 Oil Market Report says crude imports into China and Japan had each fallen by about 40%, nearly 6 mb/d combined. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's July 2026 Oil Market Report (2026-07-10) says the United States temporarily lifted restrictions on Iranian exports in June, helping Gulf oil exports rise 6.5 mb/d to 16.1 mb/d, against a 24 mb/d pre-war average. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

The IEA's May 2026 Oil Market Report lists Iran's crude supply at 3.51 mb/d in April 2026; the June report later revised April to 3.36 mb/d. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-18)

CENTCOM said on 2026-07-13 that it would enforce the blockade against vessels transiting to or from Iranian ports and coastal areas from 2026-07-14; the first blockade (2026-04-13 to 2026-06-18) redirected more than 140 vessels, disabled nine and let more than 50 humanitarian vessels through. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-18)

CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said on 2026-05-04 that 'there is no commerce going into and out of Iran' and that the blockade had been '100% effective' (party claim). (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-18)

CENTCOM says it disabled the Guinea-Bissau-flagged M/T Jalveer in the Gulf of Oman on 2026-06-10 for trying to move petroleum out of Iran, after disabling the unladen M/T Marivex bound for Iran days earlier. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-18)

CENTCOM says it disabled the unladen tanker M/T Belma in the Arabian Gulf on 2026-07-15 while it was heading to Kharg Island, the first ship disabled after the blockade resumed. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-18)

The White House said on 2026-08-28, citing CENTCOM, that 'Iran has exported zero oil from its shores since the blockade resumed in July' and that 75 blockade-running vessels were turned around; it quotes a supporter saying Iran is losing 'an additional $13 billion a month' (claims by a party to the war). (Source: whitehouse.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

CENTCOM says that on 2026-09-05, after the IRGC fired ballistic missiles at two U.S. Navy warships, it 'permanently disabled' the M/T Downy off Kharg Island and the M/T Stark 1 near Jask and 'completely destroyed' the unladen M/T Kylo in the Gulf of Oman, calling them part of a shadow network that funds the IRGC. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2026-04-24 OFAC sanctioned Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery, which Treasury calls China's second-largest teapot refinery, plus 19 shadow-fleet vessels; Treasury says teapots buy the majority of Iran's crude and that it had previously targeted four teapot refineries. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

OFAC's 2026-04-28 alert warns financial institutions about China's teapot refineries, concentrated in Shandong, saying China buys about 90% of Iran's oil exports, mostly through teapots, and that Treasury is prepared to use secondary sanctions on foreign banks. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2025-04-16 OFAC designated Shandong Shengxing Chemical, its second action against a teapot refinery, saying it bought dozens of Iranian crude shipments worth over US$1 billion. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2026-05-07 OFAC designated Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, alleging he helped a network sell Iranian oil falsely declared as Iraqi, including blending Iranian with Iraqi oil before shipment. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2026-05-11 Treasury designated 12 people and entities for enabling the IRGC's sale and shipment of Iranian oil to China and said its actions had led to freezing nearly half a billion dollars of regime-linked cryptocurrency. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2026-10-01 Treasury said that 'as the U.S. military's maritime blockade takes hold and Iran's oil revenues fall to zero', Iran has turned to its rail sector, including to move oil (Treasury claim). (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2026-10-08 Treasury sanctioned 17 shadow-fleet vessels and 17 companies under Operation Economic Outcast (launched 2026-08-24), credited the blockade with 'dwindling Iranian oil shipments outside the blockade line' and said the action neutralizes 'the vast majority' of Iran's remaining shadow fleet. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)

On 2026-10-15 Treasury designated an oil trustee it says shipped millions of barrels a month for NIOC and Naftiran Intertrade 'prior to the U.S. blockade preventing Iranian oil exports', and an Iraq-based bank it says gives Iran U.S. dollar access. (Source: home.treasury.gov, accessed 2026-10-18)