Strait of Hormuz
Updated
Summary
The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow sea lane between Iran and Oman that links the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean. Before the war it was the world's most important oil chokepoint. EIA says oil flows averaged 20.9 million barrels a day (mb/d) in the first half of 2025, about a fifth of world oil use and a quarter of seaborne oil trade. About a fifth of world LNG trade also used it: over 110 bcm in 2025, per IEA, almost all of Qatar's and the UAE's LNG. Most of it went to Asia. Only Saudi Arabia (East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea) and the UAE (Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, 1.8 mb/d) can pipe crude around it. Qatar's LNG has no bypass. Since the war began on 2026-02-28, the strait has been closed, partly reopened under a US-Iran memorandum in June, and contested again since July.
Key numbers
Oil flow through Hormuz before the war (1H25 average): 20.9 mb/d (~20% of world liquids use) (as of 2026-03-03). Source: eia.gov
LNG through Hormuz (2025): >110 bcm, almost one-fifth of global LNG trade (as of 2026-10-21). Source: iea.org
Hormuz oil flows by quarter (EIA estimate): 21.6 mb/d 4Q25; 14.9 1Q26; 4.9 2Q26 (as of 2026-10-06). Source: eia.gov
Hormuz oil flows, August / September 2026 (IEA): 7.6 mb/d / 10.9 mb/d (as of 2026-10-14). Source: iea.org
Gulf crude exports / bypass exports, September 2026: 13.9 mb/d (>75% of pre-war) / 5.6 mb/d (as of 2026-10-14). Source: iea.org
Spare crude bypass capacity (IEA): 3.5-5.5 mb/d (Saudi + UAE only) (as of 2026-10-21). Source: iea.org
Gulf crude shut-ins: September 2026 / May 2026 peak (EIA): 4.8 mb/d / 10.9 mb/d (as of 2026-10-06). Source: eia.gov
Global observed oil stocks vs end-February 2026: -509 mb (end-September) (as of 2026-10-14). Source: iea.org
IEA emergency stock release: released / agreed: ~330 mb / 400 mb (as of 2026-10-15). Source: iea.org
Hormuz transits, week to 2026-10-14 (UKMTO): 254 (~70% below pre-conflict) (as of 2026-10-16). Source: ukmto.org
Confirmed maritime security incidents since 2026-03-01 (JMIC): 153 (127 on 2026-10-04) (as of 2026-10-18). Source: ukmto.org
Middle East Gulf-Asia VLCC freight (IEA): >$37/bbl, >5x pre-war; >$1.3m/day (as of 2026-10-21). Source: iea.org
Timeline
2026-10-21 — IEA says Gulf-to-Asia VLCC freight is over $37 a barrel, more than five times pre-war, and may stay high even with better security. (Source: iea.org)
2026-10-18 — JMIC finds no substantiation for IRGC claims that two supertankers hit mines on 2026-10-17; raises the Arabian Gulf threat to SUBSTANTIAL; about 217 ships wait off Fujairah and Khor Fakkan. (Source: ukmto.org)
2026-10-16 — UKMTO records 12 attacks in a week, 10 in the strait, and says most attacked ships do not report; transits are about 70% below pre-conflict. (Source: ukmto.org)
2026-10-15 — IEA Governing Board: about 330 mb released; members will speed up the remaining ~100 mb, including diesel. (Source: iea.org)
2026-10-14 — Container ship GFS PRIDE sinks after a projectile strike on 2026-10-13; JMIC finds no substantiation for Iran's mine claim. (Source: ukmto.org)
2026-10-14 — IEA reports Hormuz flows recovered to 10.9 mb/d in September and bypass exports to 5.6 mb/d. (Source: iea.org)
2026-10-06 — EIA's October STEO assumes Middle East flows stay constrained through 4Q26 and puts September shut-ins at 4.8 mb/d. (Source: eia.gov)
2026-10-04 — JMIC counts four tanker attacks in the strait on 2026-10-02 and 2026-10-03; confirmed incidents since March reach 127. (Source: ukmto.org)
2026-09-21 — Qatar's energy minister says two damaged LNG trains need three years of repair but output could resume within weeks of a reopening. (Source: qna.org.qa)
2026-09-18 — IEA puts August Hormuz flows at 7.6 mb/d and cumulative export losses near 2.8 billion barrels. (Source: iea.org)
2026-09-10 — Attacks hit Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, which is shut as a precaution. (Source: spa.gov.sa)
2026-09-01 — US strikes IRGC targets, including mine-laying capabilities, after attempted attacks on shipping in the strait. (Source: centcom.mil)
2026-07-14 — The US resumes its blockade of Iranian ports. (Source: centcom.mil)
2026-06-20 — CENTCOM says 55 merchant ships carrying over 17 mb of oil transited the strait in one day. (Source: centcom.mil)
2026-06-19 — The White House says the signed US-Iran memorandum reopens the strait to free navigation. (Source: whitehouse.gov)
2026-04-13 — The first US blockade of Iranian ports begins; it runs to 2026-06-18. (Source: centcom.mil)
2026-03-19 — Qatar says attacks disrupted 17% of its LNG export capacity for three to five years. (Source: qna.org.qa)
2026-03-11 — IEA members agree a record 400 million barrel emergency stock release. (Source: iea.org)
2026-03-04 — QatarEnergy declares force majeure on LNG supplies. (Source: qna.org.qa)
2026-03-02 — Iran closes the strait (EIA); an attack takes Ras Laffan LNG offline (IEA). (Source: eia.gov)
Key actors and links
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (actor:irgc): Runs Iran's closures, route rules and attacks on shipping; its mine claims in October were not substantiated by JMIC.
Iran (country:iran): Coastal state on the north shore; says ships must coordinate with its Persian Gulf Strait Authority (official text UNKNOWN here).
Oman (country:oman): Coastal state on the south shore (Musandam); the southern route and Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers run through its waters.
2026 Iran war (event:2026-iran-war): The war since 2026-02-28 that turned Hormuz risk into actual closure.
US blockade enforcement (theme:us-blockade-enforcement): US blockade of Iranian ports, 2026-04-13 to 06-18 and again since 07-14; US forces also escort or facilitate transits.
Qatar (country:qatar): Ras Laffan LNG is impaired: 17% of capacity damaged, force majeure since 2026-03-04, no bypass.
LNG (commodity:lng): About a fifth of world LNG trade used the strait; Hormuz LNG fell to 0.8 Bcf/d in 2Q26 (EIA).
Refined products (commodity:diesel): Middle East product exports remain below half of pre-war; IEA members are prioritising diesel stock releases.
Saudi East–West pipeline/terminals (place:saudi-east-west-pipeline): The largest bypass, to Yanbu; hit on 2026-09-10, Yanbu loadings resumed by mid-October.
United Arab Emirates (country:united-arab-emirates): Runs the 1.8 mb/d Habshan-Fujairah bypass; about 217 ships wait off Fujairah and Khor Fakkan.
Hormuz shipping status (indicator:hormuz-throughput): The core series: 21.6 mb/d in 4Q25, 4.9 mb/d in 2Q26, 10.9 mb/d in September 2026.
Rerouting capacity (indicator:rerouting-capacity): IEA puts spare crude bypass at 3.5-5.5 mb/d; bypass exports reached 5.6 mb/d in September.
Freight (market:tanker-freight): Gulf-Asia VLCC freight over $37/bbl in mid-October, five times pre-war (IEA).
Shipping insurance (market:war-risk-insurance): Prices the next attack, not today's flow; current premium levels are UNKNOWN from a primary source.
Selective maritime disruption / impaired confidence (theme:selective-maritime-disruption): October pattern: the strait is passable but costly, with attacks spreading to the wider Gulf.
Why it matters now
The mechanism is simple: when the strait is unsafe, Gulf crude, products and LNG cannot reach buyers, producers shut in output, and the world draws on stocks. EIA estimates Hormuz oil flows fell from 21.6 mb/d in 4Q25 to 4.9 mb/d in 2Q26. EIA put Gulf crude shut-ins at a peak of 10.9 mb/d in May. IEA members agreed a record 400 million barrel stock release on 2026-03-11; about 330 million had been released by 2026-10-15. Even so, global observed stocks ended September 509 mb below end-February. Brent averaged $114/b in September (EIA).
Flows were recovering before the October attack wave. Hormuz flows rose from 7.6 mb/d in August to 10.9 mb/d in September, helped by ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. Gulf crude exports reached 13.9 mb/d, over 75% of pre-war, and bypass exports 5.6 mb/d as the East-West pipeline came back after drone attacks on 2026-09-10. Products and LPG stayed below half of pre-war (IEA).
Since 2026-10-01 attacks have surged. JMIC's confirmed incident count rose from 127 on 2026-10-04 to 153 on 2026-10-18. UKMTO recorded 12 attacks in the week to 2026-10-16, 10 of them in the strait, with one ship lost (GFS Pride sank on 2026-10-14). UKMTO also says most attacked ships do not report, so true counts are higher (UNKNOWN by how much). Transits were 254 in the week to 2026-10-14, about 70% below pre-conflict. On 2026-10-18 JMIC raised the wider Arabian Gulf threat to SUBSTANTIAL, kept the strait at SEVERE, and counted about 217 ships waiting off Fujairah and Khor Fakkan.
Claims and confirmed facts diverge. The IRGC said ships hit mines on 2026-10-14 and 2026-10-17; JMIC found no substantiation for either and recorded projectile strikes instead. Secondary reports say the IRGC made more mine claims on 2026-10-20 and that UKMTO logged two more tanker strikes, near Al Faw (Iraq) and west of Bukha (Oman), on 2026-10-20 and 2026-10-21; AA could not open the UKMTO page, so those are UNKNOWN here.
Cost is now a second channel, separate from volume. IEA says a Gulf-to-Asia VLCC cost over $37 a barrel in mid-October, more than five times pre-war, over $1.3 million a day. War-risk insurance rates are UNKNOWN from a primary source. LNG has no workaround: Qatar's energy minister says two damaged trains need three years of repair, but normal operations could resume within weeks of a reopening. Iran's stated conditions for reopening could not be read on an official Iranian page (UNKNOWN here).
Risks and open questions
Bull case: Flows were recovering before the October attacks: Hormuz carried 10.9 mb/d in September, up from 7.6 mb/d in August, and Gulf crude exports passed 75% of pre-war. Bypass exports reached 5.6 mb/d and Yanbu loadings resumed after the September pipeline strikes. IEA thinks spare bypass could be 3.5 to 5.5 mb/d, and the UAE adds a new bypass line in 2027. Half the ships attacked in the week to 2026-10-16 kept sailing or reached port, and JMIC found no substantiation for the IRGC mine claims. IEA members hold about 1.1 billion barrels of public stocks and are speeding up diesel releases. Qatar says LNG could restart within weeks of a reopening, and EIA expects most regional output back to pre-conflict levels by end-2Q27 (forecast). The June memorandum showed a deal can reopen traffic quickly.
Bear case: Confirmed attacks are rising fast: JMIC confirmed 26 incidents between 2026-10-04 and 2026-10-18, a ship sank, and attacks spread to the central Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. UKMTO says most attacks go unreported. Transits are about 70% below pre-conflict and over 200 ships wait off Fujairah. Workarounds are fragile: the East-West pipeline was already hit once, and ship-to-ship transfers add time and cost. Freight is five times pre-war and IEA says it may stay high. LNG and refined products have no real bypass; two Qatari trains need three years of repair. Stocks are 509 mb below end-February, so the buffer for a new shock is thinner, and gasoil restocking is unlikely before 2H27. The June memorandum did not hold: the US resumed its blockade on 2026-07-14.
Falsifiers: - Volume-cost mechanism weakens if transits return toward the ~138 a day 2025 baseline while VLCC freight stays near five times pre-war for months. - Bull weakens if IEA/EIA October data show Hormuz flows falling back below September's 10.9 mb/d. - Bull weakens if the East-West pipeline or Fujairah is hit again and bypass exports fall below 5 mb/d. - Bear weakens if JMIC confirmed incidents stop rising for several weeks and anchored-ship counts off Fujairah fall. - Bear weakens if QatarEnergy lifts force majeure and Hormuz LNG flows recover toward 2025 levels. - Claims-vs-facts framing weakens if JMIC or a flag state confirms a mine strike in the October period.
Value accrual gate: Not a crypto asset. Disruption moves value from energy importers, refiners buying Gulf crude and LNG buyers to bypass-route owners, non-Gulf producers and tanker owners; AA does not assume any single asset captures it.
What to watch
EIA assumption that Middle East oil flows stay constrained through 4Q26, with most regional output back by end-2Q27; a new UAE bypass pipeline in 2027. (4Q26 to 2027); Source: eia.gov
Completion of the remaining ~100 mb of IEA emergency releases, including over 20 mb of diesel; Governing Board report on further steps. (no scheduled date); Source: iea.org
JMIC confirmed-incident count and threat levels: does the Arabian Gulf stay SUBSTANTIAL and the strait SEVERE? (next JMIC updates (no fixed date)); Source: ukmto.org
UKMTO weekly transit count versus the ~70% shortfall and the share of attacks reported. (weekly); Source: ukmto.org
Qatar LNG restart after any reopening (minister: within weeks) and the three-year repair of two trains. (after any reopening); Source: qna.org.qa
Whether Gulf-Asia freight falls with transits after any reopening, or lags them as IEA warns. (no scheduled date); Source: iea.org
October Hormuz flow data in the November IEA and EIA monthly reports: does the September recovery survive the October attacks? (November 2026 (exact dates not verified)); speculative, no scheduled source
Any US response to Iran's reopening conditions; official texts not read by AA. (no scheduled date); speculative, no scheduled source
AA inference
Inference (AA): Hormuz is the graph's main transmission point from the Iran war to oil, LNG and diesel supply, and on to inflation and liquidity. October shows two separate channels. Volume: how many barrels pass. Cost: what each delivered barrel pays in freight, delay, insurance and waiting time. The two can move apart. Exports can recover through convoys, ship-to-ship transfers and pipelines while delivered cost keeps rising, which is the 'managed insecurity' case. Bypass pipelines cap the damage for crude but not for LNG or refined products, so a crude recovery can coexist with tight gas and diesel. AA treats JMIC/UKMTO confirmed incidents as the incident baseline and combatant claims (IRGC mine claims, US control claims) as claims until a vessel-level record confirms them.
Sources
EIA (page updated 2026-03-03): oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz averaged 20.9 mb/d in 1H25 (20.7 mb/d in 2024), about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption and about one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
EIA: an estimated 89% of Hormuz crude and condensate went to Asia in 1H25; Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline and the UAE's Abu Dhabi pipeline could provide about 4.7 mb/d of capacity to bypass the strait; the UAE plans another 1.5 mb/d line by 2027. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
EIA (2025-06-24): about one-fifth of global LNG trade passed through Hormuz in 2024, with Qatar exporting about 9.3 Bcf/d and the UAE about 0.7 Bcf/d through it; about 83% of those LNG flows went to Asia. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA: over 110 bcm of LNG transited Hormuz in 2025, about 93% of Qatar's and 96% of the UAE's LNG exports and almost one-fifth of global LNG trade, with no alternative routes; only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operational crude bypass pipelines, with estimated spare capacity of 3.5 to 5.5 mb/d. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA chronology: war in the region began on 2026-02-28; Ras Laffan, the world's largest liquefaction facility, has been offline since an attack on 2026-03-02; on 2026-03-11 IEA members agreed a 400 million barrel emergency stock release, the largest in IEA history. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
EIA (2026-03-26): Middle East-to-Asia VLCC rates in March 2026 were the highest since data collection began in November 2005, after Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz on 2026-03-02, driven by attack risk and high war-risk insurance costs. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
QatarEnergy declared force majeure on LNG supplies to affected buyers on 2026-03-04, after halting LNG production. (Source: qna.org.qa, accessed 2026-10-22)
Qatar's Minister of State for Energy Affairs (2026-03-19): Iranian attacks disrupted 17% of Qatar's LNG export capacity, damaging 2 of 14 LNG trains and 1 of 2 GTL plants, halting 12.8 million tonnes a year of LNG for three to five years. (Source: qna.org.qa, accessed 2026-10-22)
Qatar's Minister of State for Energy Affairs (2026-09-21): LNG cannot be moved by pipeline; repairs to the two damaged LNG trains will take three years; Qatar is ready to resume normal operations within a few weeks of the strait reopening. (Source: qna.org.qa, accessed 2026-10-22)
EIA STEO energy-security data (October 2026): Hormuz total oil flows were 21.6 mb/d in 4Q25, 14.9 mb/d in 1Q26 and 4.9 mb/d in 2Q26; Hormuz LNG fell from 10.5 Bcf/d in 4Q25 to 0.8 Bcf/d in 2Q26; EIA notes AIS data for Hormuz has been especially unreliable since end-February 2026. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
CENTCOM (2026-07-13): the first US blockade of Iranian ports ran from 2026-04-13 to 2026-06-18, redirecting more than 140 vessels and disabling nine; enforcement resumed on 2026-07-14. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-22)
White House (2026-06-19): the President signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran that it said reopens the Strait of Hormuz to free navigation. (Source: whitehouse.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
CENTCOM (2026-06-20): 55 merchant ships transited the Strait of Hormuz in one day carrying more than 17 million barrels of oil. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-22)
CENTCOM (2026-09-01): US strikes hit IRGC targets including mine-laying capabilities after attempted IRGC attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. (Source: centcom.mil, accessed 2026-10-22)
Saudi Press Agency (2026-09-11): the East-West pipeline was hit by multiple attacks on the morning of 2026-09-10 and was shut down as a precaution. (Source: spa.gov.sa, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA (2026-09-18): Hormuz flows averaged 7.6 mb/d in August, 13.1 mb/d below pre-war; cumulative export losses via the strait were approaching 2.8 billion barrels; Yanbu and Fujairah exports rose from 4.1 mb/d in February to 7.8 mb/d in June, then fell to 5.5 mb/d in August. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA Oil Market Report (2026-10-14): total oil flows through Hormuz rose by 3.7 mb/d to 10.9 mb/d in September, helped by Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers; Gulf crude exports rose 4.4 mb/d to 13.9 mb/d, over 75% of pre-war; bypass exports rose 970 kb/d to 5.6 mb/d; Middle East product and LPG shipments remain below half of pre-war. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA Oil Market Report (2026-10-14): global observed stocks were 509 mb lower than at end-February; replenishing lost gasoil inventories is unlikely before 2H27. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
EIA October 2026 STEO: Gulf crude shut-ins averaged 4.8 mb/d in September, down from 5.8 mb/d in August and a May peak of 10.9 mb/d; EIA assumes Middle East oil flows remain constrained through 4Q26 and most regional production returns to pre-conflict averages by end-2Q27; a new UAE bypass pipeline is expected in 2027. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
EIA October 2026 STEO: Brent averaged $114/b in September 2026; the forecast is $105/b for 4Q26 and $84/b for 2027. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-22)
JMIC Update 102 (2026-10-04): 127 confirmed maritime security incidents since 2026-03-01; four tanker attacks in the strait on 2026-10-02 and 2026-10-03; AIS-on vessels may be hailed to divert to the northern Iranian-controlled route. (Source: ukmto.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
JMIC Update 105 (2026-10-15): nine confirmed incidents since the last report (UKMTO 165-26 to 173-26), 149 since 2026-03-01; GFS PRIDE was struck by a projectile on 2026-10-13 and sank on 2026-10-14; JMIC found no substantiation for the IRGC claim that a container ship hit a naval mine. (Source: ukmto.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
JMIC Update 106 (2026-10-18): 153 confirmed incidents since 2026-03-01; no substantiation for the IRGC Navy's 2026-10-17 claim that two supertankers struck mines; Strait of Hormuz threat SEVERE and Arabian Gulf raised to SUBSTANTIAL; about 217 vessels anchored off Fujairah and Khor Fakkan; Yanbu loadings have resumed after the September pipeline strikes. (Source: ukmto.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
JMIC Update 106 (2026-10-18): the 2025 baseline was about 138 Hormuz transits a day; US-assisted transits averaged about 28 a day over the prior 72 hours, while independent tracking showed single-digit transits. (Source: ukmto.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
UKMTO weekly overview (2026-10-16): 12 attacks reported in the week, 10 in the Strait of Hormuz; 6 ships continued or reached port, 1 was lost, 2 were disabled; 84 incidents reported to UKMTO in the strait since 2026-02-28; UKMTO says it is struggling to report the true number because most attacked vessels refuse to report. (Source: ukmto.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
UKMTO weekly overview (2026-10-16): 254 Hormuz transits in the week (125 outbound, 129 inbound), roughly 70% below pre-conflict levels; JMIC reports 80% of transits remain energy carriers. (Source: ukmto.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA (2026-10-07): about 325 million barrels had been released under the March 2026 collective action; members support accelerating the rest and prioritising diesel; member governments hold about 1.1 billion barrels of public emergency stocks. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA Governing Board (2026-10-15): about 330 million barrels released; members agreed to complete the remaining roughly 100 million barrels, including over 20 million barrels of diesel, as soon as possible; total releases may exceed 400 million barrels. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)
IEA (2026-10-21): in mid-October a Middle East Gulf-to-Asia VLCC cost over $37 a barrel, more than five times pre-war, with charter rates over $1.3 million a day; congestion around Hormuz, rerouting and ship-to-ship transfers lengthened delivery times; rates may stay high for some time even with better security. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-22)