LNG
Updated
Summary
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas cooled to a liquid so it can be shipped by tanker to buyers that pipelines do not reach. Global LNG trade hit a record 56.3 Bcf/d in 2025, per the EIA, with the United States, Qatar and Australia supplying 63% of exports. Shell puts 2025 trade at 422 million tonnes, about 15% of world gas demand. About 20% of world LNG supply, over 110 bcm in 2025, passed through the Strait of Hormuz, including about 93% of Qatar's exports; the IEA says there is no other route for those volumes. Japan was the second-largest importer after China in 2025, at 9 Bcf/d. Asian spot prices are usually quoted by the Platts JKM benchmark; AA cites it only as the IEA, EIA or Japan's energy agency report it.
Key numbers
LNG through Hormuz, 2025: >110 bcm, about 20% of world LNG supply (93% of Qatar's exports) (as of 2025-12-31). Source: iea.org
Global LNG trade, 2025: 56.3 Bcf/d, +5.4% (EIA); 422 Mt (Shell) (as of 2025-12-31). Source: eia.gov
Qatar LNG capacity damaged: 12.8 Mtpa, 17% of export capacity, 3-5 years to repair (as of 2026-03-19). Source: qna.org.qa
Qatar + UAE LNG supply, 2026 vs 2025 (IEA forecast, assumes Q3 reopening): -45% (-54 bcm) (as of 2026-07-07). Source: iea.org
Cumulative LNG supply loss 2026-2030 (IEA): ~140 bcm (~15% of new supply) (as of 2026-07-07). Source: iea.org
JKM / TTF average, Q2 2026 (as reported by IEA): $17.5 / ~$16 per MBtu (+45% / +32% y/y) (as of 2026-06-30). Source: iea.org
US LNG exports: 2025 / 2026f / 2027f: 15.1 / 17.6 / 18.6 Bcf/d (as of 2026-10-06). Source: eia.gov
Japan LNG imports 2025; Middle East / Hormuz share: 64.98 Mt; 10.8% / 6.3% (as of 2026-03-27). Source: meti.go.jp
Japan power-sector LNG stocks: 2.64 Mt (2021-2025 end-October average 2.10 Mt) (as of 2026-10-11). Source: enecho.meti.go.jp
EU imports of US LNG, 2025; EU LNG import capacity: 76 bcm (record); 242 bcm/yr (as of 2025-12-31). Source: energy.ec.europa.eu
Russian gas share of EU gas imports: 12% in 2025 (45% in 2021) (as of 2025-12-31). Source: energy.ec.europa.eu
Timeline
2026-10-14 — ANRE reports Japan's power-sector LNG stocks at 2.64 Mt on 2026-10-11, above the five-year end-October average. (Source: enecho.meti.go.jp)
2026-10-08 — European Commission: storage below historical levels, but the EU can cover winter with more LNG; Russian long-term LNG ends from 2027. (Source: energy.ec.europa.eu)
2026-10-06 — EIA October STEO forecasts US LNG exports of 17.6 Bcf/d in 2026 and 18.6 Bcf/d in 2027. (Source: eia.gov)
2026-09-21 — Qatar's energy minister says normal operations can resume within weeks of Hormuz reopening; two damaged trains need about three years. (Source: qna.org.qa)
2026-09-11 — METI-IEA LNG Producer-Consumer Conference in Tokyo; PETRONAS and JOGMEC agree an emergency-supply framework. (Source: meti.go.jp)
2026-09-03 — European Commission says Qatari LNG production is still shut down. (Source: energy.ec.europa.eu)
2026-09-01 — EIA: US LNG exports up 23% in 1H26 to 17.4 Bcf/d; exports to Asia roughly double. (Source: eia.gov)
2026-08-28 — Cheniere completes the last Corpus Christi Stage 3 train. (Source: eia.gov)
2026-07-07 — IEA Q3 Gas Market Report: Qatar and UAE output down almost 80% in March-June; supply could fall for the first time since 2012 if Hormuz stays shut into Q4. (Source: iea.org)
2026-05-25 — Edison says 17 Qatari cargoes for Italy (about 2.2 bcm) are under force majeure through mid-August. (Source: edison.it)
2026-04-24 — IEA: the LNG supply wave is delayed by at least two years; March prices were the highest since January 2023. (Source: iea.org)
2026-04-22 — Golden Pass LNG, 70% owned by QatarEnergy, ships its first cargo from Texas. (Source: eia.gov)
2026-03-19 — Qatar says attacks knocked out 17% of its LNG export capacity (12.8 Mtpa) for three to five years. (Source: qna.org.qa)
2026-03-04 — QatarEnergy declares force majeure on LNG supplies after halting production. (Source: qna.org.qa)
2026-03-02 — An attack takes Ras Laffan, the world's largest liquefaction facility, offline. (Source: iea.org)
2026-02-09 — Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 restarts in Japan, displacing an estimated 1.3 Mt a year of LNG. (Source: eia.gov)
2026-01-26 — EU Council adopts the stepwise ban on Russian gas, with LNG fully banned from the start of 2027. (Source: consilium.europa.eu)
2026-01-23 — IEA forecasts LNG supply growth above 7% in 2026, the fastest since 2019. (Source: iea.org)
2025-10-21 — US DOE grants CP2 LNG final non-FTA export authorization for up to 3.96 Bcf/d. (Source: energy.gov)
Key actors and links
Qatar (country:qatar): Qatar exported 10.6 Bcf/d of LNG in 2025, behind only the US among named exporters; QatarEnergy halted output and declared force majeure on 2026-03-04.
Strait of Hormuz (place:strait-of-hormuz): About 20% of world LNG supply, over 110 bcm in 2025, transited the strait, with no alternative route.
2026 Iran war (event:2026-iran-war): The war's attacks took Ras Laffan offline on 2026-03-02 and damaged 12.8 Mtpa of Qatari capacity for years.
United Arab Emirates (country:united-arab-emirates): 96% of UAE LNG exports moved through Hormuz; the IEA counts UAE losses with Qatar's.
United States (country:united-states): Largest LNG exporter (15.1 Bcf/d in 2025); new plants offset much of the Gulf loss and doubled US cargoes to Asia in 1H26.
Natural gas (commodity:natural-gas): LNG is the seaborne form of natural gas; it links regional gas prices (TTF, JKM, Henry Hub).
Japan (country:japan): Second-largest importer in 2025 (64.98 Mt); only about 6% came via Hormuz, so its exposure is mainly price.
China (country:china): Largest LNG importer; its LNG imports fell 15% in 2025 and 12% in March-June 2026.
European Union (actor:european-union): The EU relies on LNG to replace Russian gas and must end Russian LNG imports from the start of 2027.
Russia (country:russia): Russian gas was 12% of EU imports in 2025 and 8.9% of Japan's LNG; EU LNG ban applies from 2027.
Australia (country:australia): Australia supplied 39.7% of Japan's LNG in 2025 and with the US and Qatar supplied 63% of world exports.
LNG infrastructure (indicator:lng-infrastructure): Liquefaction capacity (Ras Laffan damage, new US trains) sets how fast supply can respond.
Japan inflation and energy-import pressure (indicator:japan-inflation-energy-imports): Spot LNG prices feed Japan's import bill and power costs, a channel the AA Japan articles examine.
Fertilizer (commodity:fertilizer): Gas is the feedstock for nitrogen fertiliser; the IEA says high gas prices weigh on output in Asia and Europe.
Energy-driven inflation pressure (theme:energy-driven-inflation): Higher LNG prices pass into power and heating costs in importing economies.
Why it matters now
The 2026 Iran war turned LNG from a market expecting a supply wave into a market short of gas. In January the IEA expected 2026 LNG supply to grow more than 7%, mostly from North America. Then an attack on 2026-03-02 took Qatar's Ras Laffan, the world's largest liquefaction site, offline, and QatarEnergy declared force majeure on 2026-03-04. Qatar says the attacks damaged two of 14 LNG trains, 12.8 Mtpa or 17% of export capacity, for three to five years. The mechanism is simple: about a fifth of world supply cannot sail, so Asian and European buyers bid for the remaining cargoes. JKM averaged about $21/MBtu in March and $17.5 in Q2, up 45% on a year earlier. Other producers, led by new US plants, have offset about three-quarters of the loss. The IEA's July report assumed Hormuz would fully reopen in Q3 and still expected Qatar and UAE supply to fall about 45% in 2026, leaving world LNG supply roughly flat.
That Q3 reopening did not happen in the record AA can verify. On 2026-09-03 the European Commission said Qatari LNG production 'is still shut down'. On 2026-09-21 Qatar's energy minister said normal operations could resume within a few weeks of Hormuz reopening. The IEA had warned that if the strait was not fully reopened by the start of Q4, world LNG supply could fall for the first time since 2012. Inference (AA): that condition appears to have been met, but the IEA has not published an updated estimate, so the size of the 2026 decline is UNKNOWN. For Japan the channel is mainly price, not lost cargoes: Hormuz-routed LNG was about 6% of Japan's imports in 2025, and power-sector LNG stocks were 2.64 million tonnes on 2026-10-11, above the five-year October average. Europe has lower storage than usual and must also replace Russian LNG, whose long-term contracts end at the start of 2027.
Risks and open questions
Bull case: Supply case (prices ease): New capacity keeps arriving regardless of the Gulf. Golden Pass shipped its first cargo in April, Corpus Christi Stage 3 finished in August, and the EIA expects US exports to rise from 15.1 Bcf/d in 2025 to 18.6 Bcf/d in 2027. Other producers offset about three-quarters of the Gulf loss in March-June. Qatar says most of its capacity is undamaged and can return within weeks of Hormuz reopening, so a durable settlement would release a large volume quickly. Buyers are buffered: Japan's power-sector stocks are above their five-year average, Japan restarted a large reactor in February, and the EU has 242 bcm a year of import capacity.
Bear case: Shortage case (prices stay high): The IEA's July forecast assumed Hormuz reopened in Q3, and the Commission said in September that Qatari production was still shut down. If that persists, 2026 could be the first year of falling LNG supply since 2012. 12.8 Mtpa of Qatari capacity is out for about three years whatever happens, and the IEA estimates about 140 bcm of supply lost to 2030. US plants were running near capacity in March, so higher prices cannot pull much more US gas abroad until new trains start. Europe enters winter with storage below normal and must stop Russian LNG from the start of 2027. Asia has borne most of the shock, and spot-dependent buyers face the highest prices.
Falsifiers: - QatarEnergy or QNA announces a restart of Ras Laffan production or lifts force majeure before December 2026. - An IEA gas report after July 2026 shows 2026 global LNG supply flat or higher despite Hormuz staying shut into Q4. - Asian spot LNG, as reported by the IEA or EIA, falls back to 2025 levels while Hormuz remains closed. - Japan's monthly LNG import value or volume falls while power-sector LNG stocks stay above the five-year average, showing price exposure is fading. - The EU delays or suspends the 2027 Russian LNG ban under its emergency clause. - EIA revises 2027 US LNG export forecasts down because of plant delays.
Value accrual gate: Not a crypto asset. Higher LNG prices transfer income from importers to exporters with cargoes to sell; they do not help producers whose own output is shut in, such as Qatar, which lost about $20 billion of annual revenue.
What to watch
Japan Customs September 2026 trade statistics (LNG import value and volume). (2026-10-21; detailed import 確報 2026-10-29); Source: customs.go.jp
EIA November STEO: US LNG export and Henry Hub forecasts. (2026-11-10); Source: eia.gov
QatarEnergy force majeure for Edison's cargoes runs until the beginning of December 2026 (notice title read; body not readable this pass). (beginning of December 2026); Source: edison.it
End of Russian long-term LNG imports into the EU. (start of 2027); Source: energy.ec.europa.eu
Hormuz reopening and Qatar's restart, which Qatar says takes a few weeks after reopening. (no scheduled date); Source: qna.org.qa
Next ANRE update of Japan's power-sector LNG stocks. (no scheduled date (updated as supply conditions require)); Source: enecho.meti.go.jp
IEA's next quarterly Gas Market Report, with a revised 2026 LNG supply estimate. (Q4 2026 (no date verified)); speculative, no scheduled source
AA inference
Inference (AA): LNG is the graph's link from the Hormuz closure to gas and power prices in importing economies. Physical loss is concentrated in Qatar and the UAE, but the price shock spreads to every buyer that relies on spot or oil-linked cargoes, Japan included, even though Japan's direct Hormuz exposure is small. For Japan, LNG cost is one input to power prices among several, and ANRE stock data argue against a physical shortage. US exporters are the main swing supplier, but they were already running near capacity in March, so extra US supply arrives with new plants, not as a price response. AA watches three signals: any QatarEnergy restart or end of force majeure, Asian spot prices as reported by the IEA or EIA, and Japan's monthly LNG import value. The thesis that LNG is a live inflation channel weakens if Ras Laffan restarts and Asian spot prices fall back toward 2025 levels before winter.
Sources
IEA: about 20% of the world's LNG supply, over 110 bcm, moved through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025; about 93% of Qatar's and 96% of the UAE's LNG exports transited it, and there are no alternative routes for these volumes. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA: almost 90% of LNG exported through Hormuz in 2025 went to Asia, more than a quarter of the region's LNG imports, and just over 10% went to Europe. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA: Ras Laffan, the world's largest liquefaction facility, has been offline since an attack on 2 March; Qatar and UAE LNG supply fell by over 300 million cubic metres a day from 1 March, and about three-quarters of the loss was offset by other producers. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA wording: the conflict caused the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market (an oil, not LNG, statement); the page quotes its Executive Director calling the combined impacts 'the greatest threat to global energy security in history'. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
QatarEnergy declared force majeure to affected buyers on 2026-03-04, after its earlier decision to halt production of LNG and associated products. (Source: qna.org.qa, accessed 2026-10-21)
Qatar's Minister of State for Energy Affairs said on 2026-03-19 that Iranian attacks disrupted 17% of Qatar's LNG export capacity, damaging two of 14 LNG units and one of two GTL plants; repairs would halt 12.8 million tonnes a year of LNG for three to five years, with about $20 billion of annual revenue lost. (Source: qna.org.qa, accessed 2026-10-21)
On 2026-09-21 Minister al-Kaabi said the two damaged LNG trains need about three years to repair, the GTL repairs finish in Q1 2027, and Qatar can resume normal operations within a few weeks of the Strait of Hormuz reopening; he said piping gas around the strait would be uneconomic. (Source: qna.org.qa, accessed 2026-10-21)
European Commission (2026-09-03): 'Qatari LNG production is still shut down'; EU storage is lower than in previous years but the gas system can cope this winter. (Source: energy.ec.europa.eu, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA (2026-01-23, Gas Market Report Q1-2026): global LNG supply rose almost 7% in 2025 and was forecast to grow more than 7% (about 40 bcm) in 2026, the fastest since 2019, mostly from North America. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA Gas Market Report Q2-2026: TTF averaged about $18/MBtu and JKM traded near $21/MBtu in March, the highest monthly averages since January 2023; global LNG production fell 8% year on year in March; each month without Hormuz cargoes removes about 10 bcm of supply. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA (2026-04-24): the LNG supply wave is delayed by at least two years, and cumulative 2026-2030 losses could reach about 120 bcm, with tight markets through 2026 and 2027. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA Gas Market Report Q3-2026: Qatar and UAE LNG supply is forecast down about 45% (54 bcm) in 2026; non-Gulf output rose almost 18% in March-June; 2026 global LNG supply is forecast broadly flat; cumulative 2026-2030 losses are about 140 bcm, around 15% of new supply. The forecast assumes Hormuz fully reopens in Q3 2026. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA Gas Market Report Q3-2026: JKM averaged $17.5/MBtu in Q2 2026 (+45% y/y) and TTF near $16 (+32%); Asia held a $2.1/MBtu premium over Europe in March-June; China's LNG imports fell 12% in March-June. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
IEA (2026-07-07): Qatar and UAE LNG output fell almost 80% in March-June versus a year earlier; if Hormuz is not fully reopened by the beginning of Q4 2026, global LNG supply could fall year on year for the first time since 2012. (Source: iea.org, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA (2026-07-14): global LNG trade reached a record 56.3 Bcf/d in 2025, up 5.4%; US exports were 15.1 Bcf/d (26% of the world total) and Qatar's 10.6 Bcf/d; China's imports fell 15% while Europe's rose 29%. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
Shell LNG Outlook 2026 (June 2026): 2025 LNG trade was 422 million tonnes; a Hormuz opening in early Q3 would leave 2026 trade similar to 2025, while global supply could see a rare annual contraction if the disruption persists. (Source: shell.com, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA (2026-04-28): over 10 Bcf/d, about 20% of global LNG, was affected; in the week to 2026-04-24 East Asian LNG averaged $16.02/MMBtu (+51% since the closure) and TTF $14.80 (+35%); US terminals ran at 94% of maximum approved levels in March. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA (2026-09-01): US LNG exports averaged 17.4 Bcf/d in 1H26, up 23%; exports to Asia rose 2.3 Bcf/d (108%) and to Europe 1%; JKM averaged $15.56/MMBtu in 1H26, a four-year high. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA October 2026 STEO (2026-10-06): US LNG exports were 15.1 Bcf/d in 2025 and are forecast at 17.6 Bcf/d in 2026 and 18.6 Bcf/d in 2027; next STEO 2026-11-10. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA: Golden Pass LNG, owned 70% by QatarEnergy and 30% by ExxonMobil, shipped its first cargo on 2026-04-22; the three-train plant will have 2.0 Bcf/d nominal capacity. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA: Cheniere completed the seventh and final Corpus Christi Stage 3 train on 2026-08-28, taking the terminal to about 3.1 Bcf/d nominal capacity, second in the US to Sabine Pass. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
US DOE granted Venture Global CP2 LNG final non-FTA export authorization for up to 3.96 Bcf/d on 2025-10-21 and said it had authorized more than 13.8 Bcf/d of LNG exports under the current administration. (Source: energy.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
US DOE 2026 orders include a long-term non-FTA authorization for Corpus Christi Midscale 8-9 (2026-02-26), an amended Plaquemines authorization (2026-03-13) and a new non-FTA authorization for Southern LNG, Elba Island (2026-04-02). (Source: energy.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
ANRE (2026-03-27): Japan imported about 64.98 million tonnes of LNG in 2025; Middle East dependence was 10.8% and Hormuz dependence 6.3% (about 4 million tonnes); suppliers were led by Australia 39.7%, Malaysia 14.8% and Russia 8.9%, with Qatar 5.3% and the UAE 1.0%. (Source: meti.go.jp, accessed 2026-10-21)
ANRE (2026-03-27) reported Asian spot LNG (JKM) at $11.06/MMBtu on 2026-02-27 and $18.02 on 2026-03-25, and said lifting limits on inefficient coal plants in FY2026 could save about 500,000 tonnes of LNG. (Source: meti.go.jp, accessed 2026-10-21)
ANRE (2026-10-14): Japan's power-generation LNG stocks were about 2.64 million tonnes on 2026-10-11, up from 2.57 million a week earlier, against a 2021-2025 end-October average of 2.10 million. (Source: enecho.meti.go.jp, accessed 2026-10-21)
EIA: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6 (1,356 MW) restarted on 2026-02-09 and could displace about 1.3 million tonnes of LNG a year; Japan imported 9 Bcf/d of LNG in 2025, second after China. (Source: eia.gov, accessed 2026-10-21)
METI and the IEA co-hosted the LNG Producer-Consumer Conference in Tokyo on 2026-09-11; PETRONAS and JOGMEC agreed a framework for cooperation on stable LNG supply in emergencies. (Source: meti.go.jp, accessed 2026-10-21)
European Commission: EU LNG import capacity rose 76 bcm between 2021 and 2025 to 242 bcm a year; the EU imported a record 76 bcm of US LNG in 2025; Russian gas fell to 12% of EU imports in 2025 from 45% in 2021. (Source: energy.ec.europa.eu, accessed 2026-10-21)
Council of the EU (2026-01-26): the stepwise ban on Russian gas imports was adopted, with a full ban on LNG at the beginning of 2027 and on pipeline gas in autumn 2027. (Source: consilium.europa.eu, accessed 2026-10-21)
European Commission (2026-10-08): EU storage is below historical levels, but infrastructure can take more LNG; ENTSOG judges the system flexible enough for winter; work is under way for the end of Russian long-term LNG contracts at the start of next year. (Source: energy.ec.europa.eu, accessed 2026-10-21)
Edison (2026-05-25): QatarEnergy extended force majeure to cargoes due at Italy's Adriatic LNG terminal through mid-August 2026; 17 cargoes (about 2.2 bcm) were under force majeure under a 6.4 bcm-a-year contract, and the last Qatari cargoes arrived at the end of March. (Source: edison.it, accessed 2026-10-21)